Auction Theory

Auction Theory
Author: Vijay Krishna
Publsiher: Academic Press
Total Pages: 336
Release: 2009-09-28
ISBN 10: 0080922937
ISBN 13: 9780080922935
Language: EN, FR, DE, ES & NL

Auction Theory Book Review:

Vijay Krishna’s 2e of Auction Theory improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points

Putting Auction Theory to Work

Putting Auction Theory to Work
Author: Paul Milgrom,Paul Robert Milgrom
Publsiher: Cambridge University Press
Total Pages: 368
Release: 2004-01-12
ISBN 10: 9780521536721
ISBN 13: 0521536723
Language: EN, FR, DE, ES & NL

Putting Auction Theory to Work Book Review:

Table of contents

Auction Theory

Auction Theory
Author: Vijay Krishna
Publsiher: Academic Press
Total Pages: 336
Release: 2009-09-28
ISBN 10: 0080922937
ISBN 13: 9780080922935
Language: EN, FR, DE, ES & NL

Auction Theory Book Review:

Vijay Krishna’s 2e of Auction Theory improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points

Auction Theory

Auction Theory
Author: IntroBooks
Publsiher: IntroBooks
Total Pages: 40
Release: 2018-02-18
ISBN 10:
ISBN 13:
Language: EN, FR, DE, ES & NL

Auction Theory Book Review:

This theory finds its origins in field of economics. It is said to be an applied branch of the very same field. In this theory, many ways in which people act in auctions are included. This theory also describes properties possessed by auction markets. An auction may follow a certain rule or set of multiple rules. Such sets of rules are known as auction designs. These designs are also a part of this particular theory. Auction theory is said to be a representation of a standard and utilized design for real life auctions. This theory particularly targets auction designs for public sector companies and the use of sale of license.

An Introduction to Auction Theory

An Introduction to Auction Theory
Author: Flavio M. Menezes,Paulo Klinger Monteiro
Publsiher: Oxford University Press, USA
Total Pages: 178
Release: 2005
ISBN 10: 9780199275991
ISBN 13: 0199275998
Language: EN, FR, DE, ES & NL

An Introduction to Auction Theory Book Review:

The practical importance of auction theory is widely recognized. Indeed, economists have been recognized for their contribution to the design of several auction-like mechanisms, such as the U. S. Federal Communications Commission spectrum auctions, the 3G auctions in Europe and beyond, and the auction markets for electricity markets around the world. This book provides a step-by-step, self-contained treatment of the theory of auctions. The aim is to provide an introductory textbook that will allow students and readers with a calculus background to work through all the basic results. Coverage includes: the basic independent-private-model; the effects of introducing correlation in valuations on equilibrium behaviour and the seller's expected revenue; mechanism design; and the theory of multi-object auctions. The paperback edition of the text includes a new chapter which acts as a guide to current developments in auction theory.

Auction Theory for Computer Networks

Auction Theory for Computer Networks
Author: Dusit Niyato,Nguyen Cong Luong,Ping Wang,Zhu Han
Publsiher: Cambridge University Press
Total Pages: 306
Release: 2020-06-30
ISBN 10: 1108480764
ISBN 13: 9781108480765
Language: EN, FR, DE, ES & NL

Auction Theory for Computer Networks Book Review:

Acquire the tools to address emerging challenges in modern computer networks with this multidisciplinary review of the fundamentals.

Auctions

Auctions
Author: Paul Klemperer
Publsiher: Princeton University Press
Total Pages: 246
Release: 2018-06-05
ISBN 10: 0691186294
ISBN 13: 9780691186290
Language: EN, FR, DE, ES & NL

Auctions Book Review:

Governments use them to sell everything from oilfields to pollution permits, and to privatize companies; consumers rely on them to buy baseball tickets and hotel rooms, and economic theorists employ them to explain booms and busts. Auctions make up many of the world's most important markets; and this book describes how auction theory has also become an invaluable tool for understanding economics. Auctions: Theory and Practice provides a non-technical introduction to auction theory, and emphasises its practical application. Although there are many extremely successful auction markets, there have also been some notable fiascos, and Klemperer provides many examples. He discusses the successes and failures of the one-hundred-billion dollar "third-generation" mobile-phone license auctions; he, jointly with Ken Binmore, designed the first of these. Klemperer also demonstrates the surprising power of auction theory to explain seemingly unconnected issues such as the intensity of different forms of industrial competition, the costs of litigation, and even stock trading 'frenzies' and financial crashes. Engagingly written, the book makes the subject exciting not only to economics students but to anyone interested in auctions and their role in economics.

Auctions Theory and practical application

Auctions   Theory and practical application
Author: Christina Haring
Publsiher: GRIN Verlag
Total Pages: 16
Release: 2004-03-11
ISBN 10: 3638260542
ISBN 13: 9783638260541
Language: EN, FR, DE, ES & NL

Auctions Theory and practical application Book Review:

Seminar paper from the year 2003 in the subject Business economics - Trade and Distribution, grade: 2,1 (UK-Note: 60 (B)), City University London (International Business Economics), 10 entries in the bibliography, language: English, abstract: For centuries, auctions are used to buy and sell goods and are regarded as an appropriate and effective method of a dynamical pricing procedure. In the last decades, economists are increasingly engaged in finding new, more efficient ways of auctions and developing the belonging strategies for bidders and sellers. Nowadays the development of new technologies has a strong impact on the economic environment. Many traditional business styles are transforming or are already transformed into electronic transactions. The increasing spread and usage of the Internet significantly influenced the auction business and caused a shift from the traditional forms to various online auction forms with a more extensive and flexible character according to product range, locations and payment methods. The online auction pages are available 24 hours a day to people all over the world. In the last years, the reach of customers has dramatically expanded on a global basis, which indicates a clear threat to traditional auctioneers, who are loosing their market dominance. In the following study primarily the theoretical approaches of auctions and its most common types are examined. Based on one of the major types, a recent Internet auction company is analysed. Main attention is paid to the auction design and the deductive implications on revenues and economic efficiency in general.

Game Theory Bargaining and Auction Strategies

Game Theory Bargaining and Auction Strategies
Author: Gregor Berz
Publsiher: Palgrave Macmillan
Total Pages: 212
Release: 2014-12-11
ISBN 10: 1137475439
ISBN 13: 9781137475435
Language: EN, FR, DE, ES & NL

Game Theory Bargaining and Auction Strategies Book Review:

Game Theory Bargaining and Auction Strategies bridges the gulf between the theoretical economic principles of negotiation and auction theory and explores the multifaceted applications of these principles in practice. The book provides a comprehensive collection of case studies that detail the outcomes of different game theoretic and bargaining strategies. Each case study is accompanied by an accessible and lucid explanation of the relevant theoretical aspects and is written with general readers and practitioners in mind. Game Theory will supplement the already existing literature and contributes to shaping the application of game theory appropriately in the actual practice of price negotiations. Scholars and students of economics will find the feedback from practitioners about the applicability and relevance of current research worthwhile reading. Furthermore, the text contains numerous valuable insights for those involved in negotiations, especially auctions, to help increase personal success.

Auction Theory

Auction Theory
Author: Roberto Burguet
Publsiher: Anonim
Total Pages: 50
Release: 1998
ISBN 10:
ISBN 13: UCSD:31822032284085
Language: EN, FR, DE, ES & NL

Auction Theory Book Review:

Pareto Optimality Game Theory and Equilibria

Pareto Optimality  Game Theory and Equilibria
Author: Panos M. Pardalos,A. Migdalas,Leonidas Pitsoulis
Publsiher: Springer Science & Business Media
Total Pages: 865
Release: 2008-07-02
ISBN 10: 0387772472
ISBN 13: 9780387772479
Language: EN, FR, DE, ES & NL

Pareto Optimality Game Theory and Equilibria Book Review:

This comprehensive work examines important recent developments and modern applications in the fields of optimization, control, game theory and equilibrium programming. In particular, the concepts of equilibrium and optimality are of immense practical importance affecting decision-making problems regarding policy and strategies, and in understanding and predicting systems in different application domains, ranging from economics and engineering to military applications. The book consists of 29 survey chapters written by distinguished researchers in the above areas.

Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory

Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory
Author: Paul Klemperer
Publsiher: Anonim
Total Pages: 48
Release: 2000
ISBN 10:
ISBN 13: UVA:X006113202
Language: EN, FR, DE, ES & NL

Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory Book Review:

Lecture from the 8th World Congress of the Econometric Society 2000.

A Primer on Auction Design Management and Strategy

A Primer on Auction Design  Management  and Strategy
Author: David J. Salant
Publsiher: MIT Press
Total Pages: 200
Release: 2014-12-26
ISBN 10: 0262028263
ISBN 13: 9780262028264
Language: EN, FR, DE, ES & NL

A Primer on Auction Design Management and Strategy Book Review:

Auctions are highly structured market transactions primarily used in thin markets (markets with few participants and infrequent transactions). In auctions, unlike most other markets, offers and counteroffers are typically made within a structure defined by a set of rigid and comprehensive rules. Because auctions are essentially complex negotiations that occur within a fully defined and rigid set of rules, they can be analyzed by game theoretic models more accurately and completely than can most other types of market transactions.This book offers a guide for modeling, analyzing, and predicting the outcomes of auctions, focusing on the application of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction design and decision making. After a brief introduction to fundamental concepts from game theory, the book explains some of the more significant results from the auction theory literature, including the revenue (or payoff) equivalence theorem, the winner's curse, and optimal auction design. Chapters on auction practice follow, addressing collusion, competition, information disclosure, and other basic principles of auction management, with some discussion of auction experiments and simulations. Finally, the book covers auction experience, with most of the discussion centered on energy and telecommunications auctions, which have become the proving ground for many new auction designs. A clear and concise introduction to auctions, auction design, and auction strategy, this Primer will be an essential resource for students, researchers, and practitioners.

A Primer on Auction Design Management and Strategy

A Primer on Auction Design  Management  and Strategy
Author: David J. Salant
Publsiher: MIT Press
Total Pages: 200
Release: 2014-12-26
ISBN 10: 0262028263
ISBN 13: 9780262028264
Language: EN, FR, DE, ES & NL

A Primer on Auction Design Management and Strategy Book Review:

Auctions are highly structured market transactions primarily used in thin markets (markets with few participants and infrequent transactions). In auctions, unlike most other markets, offers and counteroffers are typically made within a structure defined by a set of rigid and comprehensive rules. Because auctions are essentially complex negotiations that occur within a fully defined and rigid set of rules, they can be analyzed by game theoretic models more accurately and completely than can most other types of market transactions.This book offers a guide for modeling, analyzing, and predicting the outcomes of auctions, focusing on the application of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction design and decision making. After a brief introduction to fundamental concepts from game theory, the book explains some of the more significant results from the auction theory literature, including the revenue (or payoff) equivalence theorem, the winner's curse, and optimal auction design. Chapters on auction practice follow, addressing collusion, competition, information disclosure, and other basic principles of auction management, with some discussion of auction experiments and simulations. Finally, the book covers auction experience, with most of the discussion centered on energy and telecommunications auctions, which have become the proving ground for many new auction designs. A clear and concise introduction to auctions, auction design, and auction strategy, this Primer will be an essential resource for students, researchers, and practitioners.

Auctions

Auctions
Author: Timothy P. Hubbard,Harry J. Paarsch
Publsiher: MIT Press
Total Pages: 264
Release: 2016-01-13
ISBN 10: 0262334739
ISBN 13: 9780262334730
Language: EN, FR, DE, ES & NL

Auctions Book Review:

How auctions work, in theory and practice, with clear explanations and real-world examples that range from government procurement to eBay. Although it is among the oldest of market institutions, the auction is ubiquitous in today's economy, used for everything from government procurement to selling advertising on the Internet to course assignment at MIT's Sloan School. And yet beyond the small number of economists who specialize in the subject, few people understand how auctions really work. This concise, accessible, and engaging book explains both the theory and the practice of auctions. It describes the main auction formats and pricing rules, develops a simple model to explain bidder behavior, and provides a range of real-world examples. The authors explain what constitutes an auction and how auctions can be modeled as games of asymmetric information—that is, games in which some players know something that other players do not. They characterize behavior in these strategic situations and maintain a focus on the real world by illustrating their discussions with examples that include not just auctions held by eBay and Sotheby's, but those used by Google, the U.S. Treasury, TaskRabbit, and charities. Readers will begin to understand how economists model auctions and how the rules of the auction shape bidder incentives. They will appreciate the role auctions play in our modern economy and understand why these selling mechanisms are so resilient.

Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design

Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design
Author: Martin Bichler,Jacob K. Goeree
Publsiher: Cambridge University Press
Total Pages: 904
Release: 2017-10-26
ISBN 10: 1107135346
ISBN 13: 9781107135345
Language: EN, FR, DE, ES & NL

Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design Book Review:

Following the successful PCS Auction conducted by the US Federal Communications Commission in 1994, auctions have replaced traditional ways of allocating valuable radio spectrum, a key resource for any mobile telecommunications operator. Spectrum auctions have raised billions of dollars worldwide and have become a role model for market-based approaches in the public and private sectors. The design of spectrum auctions is a central application of game theory and auction theory due to its importance in industry and the theoretical challenges it presents. Several auction formats have been developed with different properties addressing fundamental questions about efficiently selling multiple objects to a group of buyers. This comprehensive handbook features classic papers and new contributions by international experts on all aspects of spectrum auction design, including pros and cons of different auctions and lessons learned from theory, experiments, and the field, providing a valuable resource for regulators, telecommunications professionals, consultants, and researchers.

Chapters in Game Theory

Chapters in Game Theory
Author: Stef Tijs
Publsiher: Springer Science & Business Media
Total Pages: 314
Release: 2002-05-31
ISBN 10: 1402070632
ISBN 13: 9781402070631
Language: EN, FR, DE, ES & NL

Chapters in Game Theory Book Review:

Chapters in Game Theory has been written on the occasion of the 65th birthday of Stef Tijs, who can be regarded as the godfather of game theory in the Netherlands. The contributors all are indebted to Stef Tijs, as former Ph.D. students or otherwise. The book contains fourteen chapters on a wide range of subjects. Some of these can be considered surveys while other chapters present new results: most contributions can be positioned somewhere in between these categories. The topics covered include: cooperative stochastic games; noncooperative stochastic games; sequencing games; games arising form linear (semi-) infinite programming problems; network formation, costs and potential games; potentials and consistency in transferable utility games; the nucleolus and equilibrium prices; population uncertainty and equilibrium selection; cost sharing; centrality in social networks; extreme points of the core; equilibrium sets of bimatrix games; game theory and the market; and transfer procedures for nontransferable utility games. Both editors did their Ph.D with Stef Tijs, while he was affiliated with the mathematics department of the University of Nijmegen.

Discovering Prices

Discovering Prices
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publsiher: Columbia University Press
Total Pages: 224
Release: 2017-05-23
ISBN 10: 023154457X
ISBN 13: 9780231544573
Language: EN, FR, DE, ES & NL

Discovering Prices Book Review:

Traditional economic theory studies idealized markets in which prices alone can guide efficient allocation, with no need for central organization. Such models build from Adam Smith’s famous concept of an invisible hand, which guides markets and renders regulation or interference largely unnecessary. Yet for many markets, prices alone are not enough to guide feasible and efficient outcomes, and regulation alone is not enough, either. Consider air traffic control at major airports. While prices could encourage airlines to take off and land at less congested times, prices alone do just part of the job; an air traffic control system is still indispensable to avoid disastrous consequences. With just an air traffic controller, however, limited resources can be wasted or poorly used. What’s needed in this and many other real-world cases is an auction system that can effectively reveal prices while still maintaining enough direct control to ensure that complex constraints are satisfied. In Discovering Prices, Paul Milgrom—the world’s most frequently cited academic expert on auction design—describes how auctions can be used to discover prices and guide efficient resource allocations, even when resources are diverse, constraints are critical, and market-clearing prices may not even exist. Economists have long understood that externalities and market power both necessitate market organization. In this book, Milgrom introduces complex constraints as another reason for market design. Both lively and technical, Milgrom roots his new theories in real-world examples (including the ambitious U.S. incentive auction of radio frequencies, whose design he led) and provides economists with crucial new tools for dealing with the world’s growing complex resource-allocation problems.

Contract Theory

Contract Theory
Author: Researcher Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry Patrick Bolton,Patrick Bolton,Mathias Dewatripont,Professor of Economics and Co-Director of Ecare Mathias Dewatripont
Publsiher: MIT Press
Total Pages: 724
Release: 2005
ISBN 10: 9780262025768
ISBN 13: 0262025760
Language: EN, FR, DE, ES & NL

Contract Theory Book Review:

Provides an exhaustive account ot the field, using only very simple and self-contained models and relying on a whole battery of economic applications.

Internet Auctions

Internet Auctions
Author: Ernan Haruvy,Peter T. L. Popkowski Leszczyc
Publsiher: Now Publishers Inc
Total Pages: 77
Release: 2010
ISBN 10: 1601983328
ISBN 13: 9781601983329
Language: EN, FR, DE, ES & NL

Internet Auctions Book Review:

Internet Auctions reviews recent empirical and theoretical works on internet auctions with a focus on internet auction design, formats, and features that are currently debated in the marketing literature.